Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Sara L. Seck

2008

Home State Responsibility and Local
Communities: The Case of Global Mining
Sara L. Seck, Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/sara-seck/24/

Seck: Home State Responsibility and Local Communities: The Case of Global Mining

Article
Home State Responsibility and Local
Communities: The Case of Global Mining
Sara L. Seckt
Home states that are actively engaged in global mining have considered and
rejected calls to regulate the conduct of transnationalmining corporationsso
as to prevent and remedy human rights and environmental harms. This
reluctance to regulate is often expressed as a concern that extraterritorial
regulation will conflict with the sovereignty of foreign states. This paper
argues that the public internationallaw of jurisdiction is permissive of home
state regulation that can be justified under the nationality or territoriality
principles, provided that there is no true conflict with an exercise of host state
jurisdiction. In the human rights and environment contexts, it is more likely
that home state regulation would result in concurrent but not conflicting
jurisdiction, particularly where the regulation is designed to further shared
international norms. Beyond permissibility, this paper argues that
international sustainable mineral development law imposes an emerging
obligation on all states, including home states, to ensure that the three pillars
of public participation rights are respected. These rights are access to
information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in
t Sara L. Seck, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario. This
article draws upon the analysis in the author's PhD dissertation, completed under the
supervision of Professor Craig Scott, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. All errors
remain the author's.
1. House of Commons, Subcomm. on Hum. Rts & Int'l Dev. of the Standing Comm. on
Foreign Aff. and Int'l Trade, Evidence (Mar. 23, 2005) 15:35-16:45 (Can.) (describing TVI Pacific
as a Calgary-based company with a 100% ownership interest in TVI Pacific Philippine
Resources Inc., the Canatuan mine); RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY, INT'L CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. &
DEMOCRATIC DEV., HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENTS FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROJECTS

41 (2007), availableat http://www.ddrd.ca/site/_PDF/ publications/globalization/hria/full%20report may-2007.pdf (providing a
more recent description of TVI Pacific as owning forty percent of TVI Resource Development
through two wholly-owned subsidiaries based in Hong Kong and Anguilla, with at least
nineteen other companies based in Canada, the Philippines and elsewhere owning the
remaining sixty percent).
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environmental matters, and they are formulated in the global mining context
as a right of indigenous and local communities to free, prior and informed
consent. Support for the existence of such a home state obligation may be
found in the recommendations of international human rights treaty bodies,
and in the work of the International Law Commission on both state
responsibility, and the prevention and allocation of loss for transboundary
harm.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2004, a delegation of community members from the
municipality of Siocon, Zamboanga del Norte, in the Philippines came to
Canada. The purpose of their visit was to raise concerns about alleged
violations of environmental and human rights at the Canatuan mining
project on the island of Mindanao, owned by Canadian mining company
TVI Pacific,' and related concerns about Canadian government support for
the mine.2 In March 2005, two community members returned to Canada to
testify before the Parliamentary Subcommittee on Human Rights and
International Development (Subcommittee) of the Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT). 3 The Subcommittee
then devoted much of the rest of its session to exploring the problems of
4
Canadian mining companies in developing countries.
This was not the first time that the Subcommittee had heard about
problems with Canadian mining companies in developing countries.5 In
June 2005, the SCFAIT adopted a report of the Subcommittee (SCFAIT
Report) and presented it to the Canadian Parliament. 6 The SCFAIT Report
2. Conversations with Catherine Coumans, Ph.D., Research Co-ordinator of MiningWatch
Canada, a Canadian non-governmental organization, in March and September 2006. See
generally MiningWatch Canada Home Page, http://www.miningwatch.ca (last visited June 6,
2008). While in Ottawa, the community members met with Canadian MP Ed Broadbent, as
well as with government officials from the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA) and Natural Resources Canada.
3. Evidence, supra note 1. Testimony alleged that TVI Pacific Inc. violated the indigenous
communities' rights to free, prior and informed consent by engaging in involuntary
displacement and resettlement of communities, that TVI Pacific employed a large number of
heavily armed security forces trained by the Philippine military to protect the mine in a
heavily militarized area, and that environmental problems threatened food security,
subsistence living and sustainable livelihoods of local communities. Canadian government
support for the mine included CIDA Canada Fund money channelled through TVI Pacific,
and positive endorsements of the project by current and former Canadian ambassadors to the
Philippines, along with general support by the Canadian embassy in Manila. Id. Two
villagers from Siocon made statements in camera. House of Commons, Subcomm. on Hum.
Rts. & Int'l Dev. of the Standing Comm. on Foreign Aff. & Int'l Trade, 1st Sess., 38th Parl.,
Minutes of Proceedings,No. 012 (March 23, 2005) (Can.).
4. See, e.g., House of Commons, Subcomm. on Hum. Rts. & Int'l Dev. of the Standing
Comm. on Foreign Aff. & Int'l Trade, Evidence (May 18, 2005) 15:30-17:10 (Can.). Company
evidence presented before the Subcommittee on May 18 countered allegations made on March
23 by claiming in part that they were being made by illegal small scale miners who were
responsible for heavily polluting the area prior to TVI Pacific's involvement. TVI Pacific
argued that the company should be credited with cleaning up environmental contamination
and providing employment to local indigenous communities.
Two indigenous
representatives spoke in favor of TVI Pacific. Id.
5. HOUSE OF COMMONS, STANDING COMM. ON FOREIGN AFF. & INT'L TRADE, 1st Sess., 38th
Parl., FOURTEENTH REPORT: MINING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (2005) (Can.) [hereinafter
SCFAIT REPORT].
6. Id. The SCFAIT Report received all party unanimous support at the subcommittee level
and was unanimously adopted by the SCFAIT. House of Commons, Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Evidence (June 20, 2005) 15:35-16:15; House of
Commons, Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., Minutes of
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states as fact that
mining activities in some developing countries have had adverse
effects on local communities, especially where regulations
governing the mining sector and its impact on the economic and
social wellbeing of employees and local residents, as well as on the
environment, are weak or non-existent, or where they are not
enforced .7
The Subcommittee then expressed concern that "Canada does not yet
have laws to ensure that the activities of Canadian mining companies in
8
developing countries conform to human rights standards."
The Subcommittee recommended that Canada put in place stronger
incentives to encourage compliance with international human rights
standards, as well as stronger monitoring and complaints mechanisms. 9
The SCFAIT Report also called for "clear legal norms" to ensure that
Canadian corporations and residents were held accountable for
environmental and human rights violations. 10 However, in October 2005,
the government tabled a response which rejected many of the
recommendations in the SCFAIT Report." The Government Response
noted that the international community is "still in the early stages of
defining and measuring" corporate social responsibility (CSR),
"particularly with regard to human rights." 12 The recommendation to
Proceedings,No. 021 (June 15, 2005) (Can.).
7. SCFAIT REPORT, supra note 5. The SCFAIT Report made ten recommendations, eight of
which were directed to the problems of mining companies generally, while two were reserved
specifically for the case of TVI Pacific. Id.
8. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 2-3. The Subcommittee stated that measures "must include" making Canadian
government financing and services conditional upon compliance with corporate social
responsibility and human rights standard. Id. at 2.
10. Id. at 3. Other recommendations included the need to improve services to Canadian
mining companies operating abroad so as to assist them in complying with environmental
and human rights obligations; the need to build governance capacity in developing countries;
and the need to ensure that projects supported by international financial institutions comply
with international human rights standards. Id.
11. DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFF. & INT'L TRADE, MINING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE REPORT OF THE
STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2005) (Can.)

[hereinafter GOVERNMENT RESPONSE]. But see id. at 11-15 (endorsing the recommendations to
increase and improve services to corporations, to develop governance capacity in developing
countries, and to integrate and mainstream international human rights standards in the work
of international financial institutions).
12. Id. at 4. Compare id. at 4-5 (committing the Canadian government to working with
other states to clarify a CSR framework, and expressing support for the work of Professor
John Ruggie in his capacity as the Special Representative to the UN Secretary-General on the
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
[hereinafter SRSGI). See generally U.N. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Interim Report of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-Generalon the Issue ofHuman Rights and TransnationalCorporations
and Other Business Enterprises, 62nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006)
[hereinafter Ruggie Interim Report]; U.N. Hum. Rts. Coun., Business and Human rights: Mapping
InternationalStandards of Responsibility and Accountabilityfor Corporate Acts: Report of the Special
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol11/iss1/10
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establish clear legal norms to hold Canadian corporations accountable was
rejected, 13 with a commitment only to examining the "best practices of
other states." 14 While the Government Response did acknowledge that
states are primarily responsible for the promotion and protection of human
rights and the environment, 15 it also stated that Canadian law does not
generally provide for "extraterritorial application." 16 Moreover, to do so
could raise several problems including "conflict with the sovereignty of
foreign states; conflicts where states have legislation that differs from that
of Canada; and difficulties with Canadian officials taking enforcement
17
action in foreign states."
This Article argues that, despite the concerns expressed in the
Government Response, Canada and other home states should have laws to
ensure that the international operations of home state extractive companies
do not violate international human rights and environmental norms, and to
ensure that any local communities impacted by such violations have access
to legal recourse in home state courts. Part II will outline how Australia
and Canada have approached this question. Part III will argue that home
state concerns that the exercise of jurisdiction over transnational corporate
conduct violates jurisdictional principles of public international law are
misplaced. Home state jurisdiction is clearly permissible. Part IV will
examine whether, beyond permissibility, international sustainable mineral
development law imposes an obligation on all states, including home
states, to both prevent and remedy harm to local communities.
II.

HOME STATE RELUCTANCE

Canada is not the first home state to question whether or not it should
enact laws to address human rights and environmental concerns relating to
the global mining activities of home state corporations. 8 In 2000 and 2001,
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and TransnationalCorporations
and Other Business Enterprises, UN.Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (Feb. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Ruggie
Report 2007]; Business and Human Rights Resource Centre http://www.businesshumanrights.org/Gettingstarted/ UNSpecialRepresentative (providing general materials
relating to the SRSG's work).
13. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 11, at 10.
14. Id. at 10.
15. Id. at 8. But see id. at 2 (noting that there is a need to "reconcile the call for global
business standards with the primary responsibilityof host governments to ensure that companies
act in compliance with domestic and international law") (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 9.
17. Id. (explaining that Canadian criminal and tort law may or may not be applied to
provide legal accountability for corporate wrongs abroad; declining to address whether there
is anything that the government could do legislatively to facilitate corporate accountability).
18. See, e.g., JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

160-71 (2006) (setting out examples of extraterritorial regulatory techniques considered by
European countries, the U.S., and Australia); Surya Deva, Acting Extraterritorially to Tame
Multinational Corporationsfor Human Rights Violations: Who Should 'Bell the Cat'?, 5 MELB. J.
INT'L L. 37, 52-63 (2004) (describing proposed home state regulations in Australia and the
U.S.); Adam McBeth, A Look at Corporate Code of Conduct Legislation, 33 COMMON L. WORLD
REV. 222 (2004) (comparing corporate code of conduct bills proposed in the United States,
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the Australian Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations
and Securities held hearings 19 to determine whether to enact a proposed
Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000 ("Bill 2000").20 The object of Bill 2000
was to impose environmental, employment, health and safety and human
rights standards on the conduct of Australian or related corporations
operating in a foreign country. 21 It was brought to the Committee's
attention that the purpose of Bill 2000 was not to impose Australian
standards on other countries but rather to ensure that Australian and
Australian-related companies acted in compliance with fundamental
international law principles of human rights and environmental
protection. 22 Nevertheless, the Committee concluded that the standards
were Australian and could only be interpreted as implying that local
standards are inferior. 23 Bill 2000 was then rejected as the legislation would
24
be viewed overseas as "arrogant, patronising, paternalistic and racist."
Bill 2000 would have allowed persons who have suffered loss or
damage or who are reasonably likely to suffer loss or damage from
activities of Australian corporations overseas to bring actions in Australian
Federal Court seeking injunctions or compensation. 25 The fact that existing
Australian law already permitted some similar types of actions contributed
to the conclusion that at least parts of Bill 2000 were unnecessary. 26 Under
Australia, and the U.K.).
19. PARLIAMENTARY JOINT STATUTORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATIONS AND SECURITIES,
REPORT ON THE CORPORATE CODE OF CONDUCT BILL 2000, at 1 (2001) (Austl.) thereinafter
COMMITTEE REPORT], available at

http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/corporations-ctte/completed-inquiries/199902/ corp-code/report/ report.pdf..
20. Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000, No. 00163 (2000) (Austl.) [hereinafter Bill 2000],
available at
http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/Repository/Legis/oldBills/Linked/12110412.pdf.
Bill 2000 was designed to apply outside of Australia, but only to corporations which employ
or engage the services of 100 or more persons in a country other than Australia. Bill 2000
would have applied directly to companies incorporated in Australia that operated overseas,
as well as to subsidiaries of Australian companies and holding companies that operated
overseas but were not incorporated in Australia. See also Tania Penovic, Undermining
Australia'sInternationalStanding, 11 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTs. 71, 106 (2005) (discussing unsuccessful
revisions to Bill 2000 proposed in 2004).
21. Bill 2000, supra note 20, § 3. Companies would have been required to report their
compliance with the standards and would have been subject to a civil penalty for
contravention of the standards. See also Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate,
September 6, 2000, 17457-61 (Senator Vicki Bourne) (Austl.) (citing the need to address the
problems associated with Australian mining companies operating internationally), available at
http://www.democrats.org.au/speeches/index.htm?speech-id=459&display=1.
22. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 19,
3.68-.70.
23. Id.
24. Id. 1 4.47-.49.
25. Bill 2000, supra note 20, § 17.
26. COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 19,
3.83-.109 (discussing Dagi v. B.H.P. (1997) 1 VR
428 (Austl.)). The Dagi litigation from 1997 is the clearest example of the possibility of
successful litigation in Australian courts against an Australian mining company operating
overseas for environmental harm. The parties settled after the court agreed to take
jurisdiction over several of the claims put forward by the plaintiffs. Forum non conveniens was
not argued. Id. See also Peter Prince, Bhopal, Bougainville and Ok Tedi: Why Australia's Forum
Non Conveniens Approach is Better, 47 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 573, 593-95 (1998) (arguing that the
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Canadian interpretations of private international law doctrines, however, it
is less likely that such an action would succeed. 27 Moreover, Australia took
steps to investigate allegations of international criminal conduct by Anvil
Mining Company regarding the facilitation of egregious rights-violating
military conduct in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 28 While Canada
has similar legislation in place implementing its obligations under the
statute of the International Criminal Court, Canada does not appear to
have initiated any similar investigation, even though Anvil Mining is
incorporated in Canada. 29 The Canadian government has also intervened
twice 30 in support of Talisman Energy in New York state private law
litigation under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) 31 that alleges Talisman
Australian courts' refusal to adopt the U.S. and U.K. forum non conveniens approach enabled
the peaceful resolution of the Dagi litigation).
27. Cf. Recherches Internationales Quebec v. Cambior Inc. [19981 1998 CarswellQue 4511
(C.S. Aug. 14, 1998), available at 1998 WL 1999921 (Can.) (dismissing the action on the basis of
forum non conveniens, with a large costs award instituted against the plaintiff). See also Sara L.
Seck, Environmental Harm in Developing Countries Caused by Subsidiaries of Canadian Mining
Companies: the Interface of Public and Private InternationalLaw, 37 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 139, 154-68
(1999) (providing a detailed comparison of Cambior and Dagi). Other jurisdictions are
arguably more open to transnational litigation than Canada for a variety of reasons, including
the absence of costs awards and the existence of facilitating legislation such as the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000), in the United States, and the abolition of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens in Europe, including the United Kingdom. See, e.g., ZERK,
supra note 18, at 124-27,198-240.
28. Joanna Kyriakakis, Australian Prosecution of Corporationsfor International Crimes: The
Potential of the Commonwealth Criminal Code, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 809, 811 (2007). Three Anvil
employees were prosecuted by a Congolese Military Court in 2007 and found not guilty. For
a history and critique of the Congolese trial, see generally GLOBAL WITNESS, RAID, ACIDH, &
ASADHO/KATANGA,
KILWA
TRIAL:
A
DENIAL
OF
JUSTICE,
available
at
http://www.globalwitness.org/media-library-get.php/463/kilwa-chron-en_170707.pdf;
Adam McBeth, Crushed by an Anvil: A Case Study on Responsibility for Human Rights in the
Extractive Sector, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L. J. 127 (2008).
29. Compare Kyriakakis, supra note 28 (referencing a 2005 Australian newspaper report
that Canadian authorities were also investigating Anvil Mining), with Samer Elatrash, Making
a Killing in the Congo: Controversy Dogs a Canadian-incorporated Mining Company at the Centre of a
Massacre Investigation,
MONTREAL
MIRROR,
June
22-28,
2006,
available at
http://www.montrealmirror.com/2006/062206/news2.html
(suggesting that Canadian
authorities were not investigating Anvil's involvement in the Kilwa incident). The possibility
of prosecuting corporations for violations of international criminal law has become a reality in
many countries, despite the fact that the statute of the international criminal court does not
extend ICC jurisdiction to corporate entities. ANITA RAMASASTRY & ROBERT C. THOMPSON,
COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR GRAVE
BREACHES
OF
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
13-29
(2006),
available
at
http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/536/536.pdf.
30. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 2005 WL 2082846, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005) (discussing diplomatic note from the Canadian Embassy to the U.S.
government); Brief of Amicus Curiae the Government of Canada in Support of Dismissal of
the Underlying Action, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., No. 01-9882
(2d Cir. May 8, 2007).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). ATCA is a jurisdictional statute that provides subject matter
jurisdiction for civil actions brought before U.S. federal courts in relation to a modest number
of clearly defined norms recognized under the law of nations (international law). Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 124 S. Ct. 2736, 2755-2761 (2004). Without the ATCA, it is
doubtful whether private parties would be able to sue perpetrators for violations of
international criminal law norms.
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was complicit with the Sudanese government in violations of international
32
criminal law.
many
of the
Response rejected
While the Government
with
enthusiasm
recommendations in the SCFAIT Report, it did embrace
the idea of holding a multi-stakeholder public consultation on the
problems of Canadian mining companies operating in developing
countries. 33 The proposed outcome of the process was broadened to a
commitment to providing the SCFAIT with a report presenting
recommendations for not only the Canadian government, but also "NGOs,
labour organizations, business and industry associations." 34 In essence, the
government committed to participating in a process in which its role was
equal to that of other stakeholders, rather than acknowledging that as a
state, the government of Canada possesses the authority - and has a
35
responsibility - to govern in the public interest.
The National Roundtables on Corporate Social Responsibility and the
Canadian Extractive Sector in Developing Countries were held from June
to November 2006 in four Canadian cities. 36 A governmental steering
committee worked closely with an Advisory Group composed of
representatives of Canadian industry groups and civil society. 37 In March
2007, the Advisory Group issued a report replete with proposals for
Canadian government action. 38 However, even the Advisory Group could
32. The Talisman case was dismissed on a summary judgment motion in Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., 453 F.Supp.2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), which is currently
under appeal. Talisman was alleged to have aided and abetted the government of the Sudan
in the commission of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Talisman Energy is
a Canadian company, yet, as Canada does not have legislation similar to the ATCA, no
private law action has been brought in Canadian courts in relation to the Sudanese
allegations.
33. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 11, at 4; SCFAIT REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.
34. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 11, at 4.

35. Thus, Canada is a partner in a process, instead of taking on a mandating, facilitating or
endorsing role. See TOM Fox, HALINA WARD & BRUCE HOWARD, PUBLIC SECTOR ROLES IN
STRENGTHENING CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: A BASELINE STUDY 3-6 (2002). While there is

nothing wrong with the state taking on a partnership role, it is problematic when the state
refuses to concede that it might also have a part to play in a mandating role. See, e.g., Timothy
David Clark & Liisa North, Mining and Oil in Latin America: Lessons from the Past, Issues for the
Future, in COMMUNITY RIGHTS AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: CANADIAN MINING AND OIL
COMPANIES IN LATIN AMERICA 1, 8 (Liisa North et al eds., 2006); Joan Kuyek, Legitimating
Plunder: Canadian Mining Companies and Corporate Social Responsibility, in COMMUNITY RIGHTS
AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 215-18.
36. Can. Dep't of Foreign Aff. & Int'l Trade, The National Roundtables on Corporate
http://geo.international.gc.ca/cipHome
Page,
Responsibility
Social
pic/current_discussions/csr-roundtables-en.aspx (last visited June 6, 2008).
37. The National Roundtables were organized by an interdepartmental Steering
Committee chaired by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and
included representatives from Natural Resources Canada, Environment Canada, CIDA,
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, the Department of Justice, Export Development Canada
and the Privy Council Office. See generally NATIONAL ROUNDTABLES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) AND THE CANADIAN EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,

(2007), available at http://geo.international.gc.ca/cipADVISORY GROUP REPORT
a
(providing
pic/library/Advisory% 20Group% 20Report%20-%2March%202007.pdf
description of the process and resulting recommendations).
38. Id. Details of the extensive recommendations found in the Advisory Group Report are
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not agree on whether Canada should implement legislation to ensure that
corporate wrong-doers are held legally accountable in Canadian courts. 39
One year later, there has still been no indication from the Canadian
government as to whether it plans to take any action in light of the
Advisory Group Report. In the meantime, the Canadian government has
joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative as a supporting
member.40 In addition, a private member's bill has been tabled that would
allow for private lawsuits to be brought by foreign plaintiffs in Canada's
Federal Court seeking compensation for violations of universal human
41
rights, as well as environmental and labour rights.
The Canadian example, and to a lesser degree the Australian example,
demonstrate that home states are reluctant to enact legally binding
regulation of extractive companies operating internationally for
compliance with international human rights and environmental norms,
particularly where the conduct at issue falls short of universally
condemned international criminal law norms. The following section will
examine whether this reluctance is misplaced.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL

LAW OF JURISDICTION

The term "jurisdiction" is used to describe "the limits of the legal
competence of a State ... to make, apply, and enforce rules of conduct
upon persons." 42 No state has the right under international law to exercise
jurisdiction over any circumstances it chooses, as this may impinge upon
the sovereign interests of other states. 43 The phrase "extraterritorial
beyond the scope of this paper. In brief, the Advisory Group Report recommended that the
government develop a CSR framework composed of standards that Canadian extractivesector companies operating abroad are expected to meet, with the expectation reinforced
through "reporting, compliance and other mechanisms," including an independent
ombudsman office, and a compliance review committee. Id. at 3. The standards would
initially be composed of International Finance Corporation standards supplemented by the
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, with a multi-stakeholder Canadian
Extractive Sector Advisory Group advising the government on both implementation and
further development of the CSR Framework. Id. at iv-v, 58-60.
39. Id. at 42-45. Civil society participants recommended that the Canadian government
adopt federal legislation to regulate the foreign operations of Canadian extractive companies
in accordance with the CSR Framework standards, linked to a civil liability system of
enforcement. Id. Industry participants argued that existing criminal and civil liability regimes
combined with voluntary guidelines were sufficient. Id. at 42-44. Moreover, industry
participants expressed concern that new regulation would "violate rules against
extraterritorial legislation, interfere with Canada's foreign policy objectives and damage
international trade and investment." Id. at 42.
40. Press Release, Dep't of Fin. Can., Canada's New Government Supports An
International Initiative to Improve Transparency in Resource-Rich Countries (Feb. 10, 2007),
available at http://www.fin.gc.ca/news07/07-012e.html.
41. Bill C-492, An Act to amend the Federal Courts Act (international promotion and
protection of human rights), 2nd Sess., 39th Parl., 2007.
42. Vaughan Lowe, Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 335, 335 (Malcolm D. Evans ed.,
2006).
43. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 457 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds.,
1992).
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jurisdiction" is frequently used when referring to the regulation of
activities that are not wholly within the regulating state, 44 and home state
regulation is usually assumed to require the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. 45 Yet the term "extraterritorial" is both notoriously difficult to
47
define 46 and frequently characterized as "exorbitant," if not "illegal."
4
This sentiment is clearly evident in the Canadian Government Response. "
According to Jennifer Zerk, one of the problems with the traditional
analysis of home state jurisdiction under public international law is the
49
assumption that regulation means "command and control" regulation.
This both discounts modem notions of what regulation is, and obscures the
regulatory role performed by judges in disputes requiring the application
of the doctrines of private international law. 50 Zerk proposes that home
state regulation is better understood if extraterritoriality is defined less
formally, and recognition given to the legitimacy of alternate forms of
home state practice that impose extraterritorial responsibilities, grant
51
extraterritorial rights, or offer extraterritorial benefits.
Despite the promise of Zerk's proposal, continued reference to
extraterritoriality in relation to home state jurisdiction may serve only to
disguise the existence of real territorial links that provide a solid if
preliminary justification for the reasonable exercise of home state
44. ANDREAS R. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND
REASONABLENESS: ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (1996).

THE

QUEST

FOR

45. The most significant recent example of this is evident in the work of the SRSG. See,
e.g., Ruggie Report 2007, supra note 12, 15; U.N.G.A., Hum. Rts. Coun., Report of the Special
Representativeof the Secretary General on the Issue of Human Rights and TransnationalCorporations
and Other Business Enterprises:Addendum 2, CorporateResponsibility Under InternationalLaw and
Issues in
Extraterritorial Regulation: Summary of Legal Workshops, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/4/35/Add.2 (Febr. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Ruggie Legal Workshops]; Ruggie Interim
Report, supra note 12, 71("[O]ne critical area of legal standards that merits close attention is
the possible extension in the extraterritorial application of some home countries' jurisdiction
for the worst human rights abuses committed by their firms abroad."). See also OLIVIER DE
SCHUTTER, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDIcTION AS A TOOL FOR IMPROVING THE HUMAN RIGHTS
ACCOUNTABILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, available at http://www.reports-and-

materials.org/Olivier-de-Schutter-report-for-SRSG-re-extraterritorial-jurisdiction-Dec2006.pdf (report prepared as a background paper for the legal experts meeting with John
Ruggie in Brussels, Nov. 3-4, 2006, December 2006) [hereinafter DE SCHUTTER REPORT].
46. See, e.g., ZERK, supra note 18, at 140-42 (proposing an "alternative definition of
'extraterritoriality"'); DE SCHUTTER REPORT, supra note 45, at 8-10 (discussing "the meanings of
extraterritorial jurisdiction"). See also LOWENFELD, supra note 44, at 16 (stating that a
satisfactory definition of extraterritorial jurisdiction is "doomed to failure").
47. LOWENFELD, supra note 44, at 15. "[Wlhen you read a book or article, or attend a
symposium with 'extraterritorial jurisdiction' in the title, be advised that the authors or
editors or sponsors are attempting to communicate an attitude before the audience has read or
heard a single phrase." Id. at 16.
48. CorhpareSCFAIT REPORT, supra note 5 (supporting home state measures to ensure legal
accountability but making no mention of extraterritoriality), with GOVERNMENT RESPONSE,
supra note 11, at 9-10 (opposing additional measures of legal accountability and framing the
analysis in terms of extraterritoriality).
49. ZERK, supra note 18, at 105.
50. Id. See also Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory
Function of Private InternationalLaw in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209,
209 (2002).
51. ZERK, supra note 18, at 140-42.
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jurisdiction. This Part will first explore nationality and territoriality as
preliminary justifications for the exercise of home state jurisdiction, then
examine the resolution of jurisdictional conflicts where concurrent
jurisdiction is exercised by both home and host states.
A. Nationality and Territoriality
A common justification for home state regulation under public
international law is the nationality principle.5 2 States are free to decide
who their nationals are, and to "lay down the conditions for a grant of
nationality in their own laws." 53 Thus, corporate nationality is determined
by each state under its own laws, and state practice diverges. 54 Common
law states tend to accord nationality on the basis of incorporation within
their territory regardless of where the business or management is carried
out, while civil law states confer nationality on the basis of where the
corporation has the seat of its management (siege sociale) 5 As corporations
frequently incorporate in one jurisdiction for tax or other purposes but
undertake their business or management in another jurisdiction,
corporations may in practice have more than one nationality. 56 Moreover,
state regulatory practices diverge in different contexts, thus states may
apply laws on the basis of incorporation in one context, then implicitly
adopt a seat of management test when applying law on the basis of a
57
control test that references owners, managers, or operators.
Corporate nationality becomes even more complex when the conduct
being regulated is undertaken by a transnational or multinational
corporations 8 While a state may apply its law directly to a corporate
national that has set up a branch or an office in another state, it may not as
a rule apply its laws directly to a foreign affiliate-whether a subsidiary or
an associate 59 - that has been set up as a separate legal entity under the
52. See id. at 106-09; Lowe, supra note 42, at 345.
53. Lowe, supra note 42, at 345. Nationality should, "in principle, be the juridical
expression of a close factual link between the individual and the national State." Id. at 346. Cf.
Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6); Constitution of the Maritime Safety
Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Advisory
Opinion, 1960 I.C.J. 150 (June 8).
54. ZERK, supra note 18, at 147-49; Lowe, supra note 42, at 347.
55. Lowe, supra note 42, at 345-46. Cf. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company,
Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 42, T 70 (Feb. 5, 1970). But see CYNTHIA DAY WALLACE,
THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND LEGAL CONTROL: HOST STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN AN ERA

OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION 132-37 (2002) (calling the ultimate approach of the two theories
"virtually synonymous").
56. Lowe, supra note 42, at 346.
57. DE SCHUTTER REPORT, supra note 45, at 30. In practice, then, corporate nationality may
be most significant as a definitional issue in terms of assessing which firms qualify for
government support, whether political, financial, or in terms of diplomatic protection.
WALLACE, supra note 55, at 135-37; Linda A. Marby, Multinational Corporations and U.S.
Technology Policy: Rethinking the Concept of Nationality,87 GEO. L. J.563, 593 (1999).
58. "Transnational corporation" and "multinational corporation" will be used
interchangeably here.
59. A subsidiary is generally defined as a company in which a parent company has a
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laws of the host state. 60 In the mining context, many projects are
international joint ventures with several parent company shareholders of
different nationalities investing in a company incorporated in the host
state. 61 It is possible for home states to regulate parent companies that
exercise control over foreign subsidiaries in such as way as to impose a
course of conduct on the foreign subsidiary without directly regulating the
subsidiary. 62 Where an associate company is not under the effective
control of the parent company, a home state may be limited to attempting
63
to influence the conduct of the associate through minority shareholders.
Corporate enterprise theory has emerged as an alternative to corporate
entity theory in order to overcome the difficulties presented by corporate
nationality in a multinational enterprise comprised of many separate legal
entities. 64 Under corporate enterprise theory, entities that are sufficiently
economically integrated are considered as a whole.
Yet corporate
enterprise theory remains an "emerging doctrine, not yet fully articulated
65
or universally accepted."
A better way to think about justifying home state regulation in

majority or controlling interest, while an associate company is one in which the parent has a
non-controlling or minority interest. Both subsidiary and associate companies are affiliates of
the parent company. WALLACE, supra note 55, at 102-03.
60. Cf. Phillip 1. Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights Against Multinational Corporations
Under United States Law: Conceptual and Procedural Problems, 50 AMER. J. COMP. L. 493, 499
(2002); Phillip I. Blumberg, Accountability of MultinationalCorporations:The BarriersPresented by
Concepts of the Corporate Juridical Entity, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 299 (2001);
F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited After Twenty Years, 186 REC. DES
COURS 9, 56 (1984) (describing parent and subsidiary companies as having different
"sovereigns"). See also ZERK, supra note 18, at 106 (reproducing the U.S. position as set out in
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 213 (1987)) and 166 (noting that one

particularly problematic aspect of the Australian Bill 2000 was the direct application of law to
subsidiaries, despite obvious enforcement difficulties raised by this approach, without any
consideration given to the use of indirect parent-based methods of regulation).
61. JAMES OTTO & JOHN CORDES, THE REGULATION OF MINERAL ENTERPRISES: A GLOBAL

PERSPECTIVE ON ECONOMICS, LAW AND POLICY 4-29 (2002). Cf.Robert Pritchard, Safeguardsfor
Foreign Investment in Mining, in INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE MINERAL LAW AND
POLICY: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 73, 73-79 (Elizabeth Bastida et al. eds., 2005). One of these
companies may also be incorporated in the host state, and could be a host state-owned
company.
62. Mann, supra note 60, at 60-63. See also ZERK, supra note 18, at 108 (describing this as
"parent-based" extraterritorial regulation). Compare WALLACE, supra note 55, at 14047
(arguing that "it is not so much the actual amount of capital interest (or ownership) as it is the
extent of managerial participation on the part of the parent company in the operations of the
affiliated company that determines de facto control"), 159-88 (discussing the lack of
international consensus on the meaning of "control").
63. William F. Flanagan & Gail Whiteman, Ethics Codes and MNCs as Minority Shareholders:
The Case of a Bauxite Mine in Brazil, in ETHICS CODES, CORPORATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF
GLOBALIZATION 212, 234-38 (Wesley Cragg ed., 2005). Cf.John Child & Suzana B. Rodrigues,
Corporate Governance in International Joint Ventures: Toward a Theory of Partner Preferences, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM ORGANIZATION 89,108 (Anna Grandori ed., 2004).
64. LOWENFELD, supra note 45, at 85-86; ZERK, supra note 18, at 228-33. See also Upendra
Baxi, Mass Torts, Multinational Enterprise Liability and Private InternationalLaw, 276 REC. DES
COURS 297, 399-401 (1999) (noting that the principle of absolute multinational enterprise
liability has been adopted by the courts of India).
65. LOWENFELD, supra note 44, at 85.
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol11/iss1/10
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jurisdictional terms is to focus on territorial points of control linking the
home state with the conduct being regulated. These territorial links may be
found in home state institutional structures without which transnational
corporate conduct could not take place. These include stock exchanges,
financial institutions and enabling corporate laws, as well as specific
support mechanisms associated with services provided by export credit
66
agencies and trade commissioners.
The territorial principle is a "corollary of the sovereignty of a State over
its territory," 67 and states "enjoy 'plenary' jurisdiction over their
territory." 68 Subject to duties under international human rights and other
similar laws, states may "legislate as they please, on any matter
whatsoever" within state territory. 69 Yet many "incidents" are not
confined to a single jurisdiction, with some straddling many different
states, while in other cases it is not always easy to say where "the act" was
committed. 70 Accordingly, several variations on territorial jurisdiction
have emerged. The phrase "subjective territorial jurisdiction" is sometimes
used where an incident is initiated within state territory but completed
elsewhere, while "objective territoriality" describes an incident completed
within state territory but initiated outside. 71 A third doctrine, the effects
doctrine, has been used by the United States to justify assertions of
jurisdiction over conduct with no physical link to U.S. territory, but rather
on the basis that the conduct was intended to produce economic effects
within the U.S.72 It has been argued that the effects doctrine could be used
to justify home state regulation in the human rights and environmental
realm on the basis that without it, the reputation of the home state would
be undermined, jeopardizing home state foreign policy initiatives. 73
66. All of these institutional structures are created to some degree through an exercise of
legislative jurisdiction that provides the institution created with powers that allow it-or even
mandate it -to participate in the global economic order for the benefit of the home state. See
generally ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 38 (providing an overview of Canadian
institutional structures that support global mining).
67. Lowe, supra note 42, at 342.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 342-43.
70. Id. at 343, 34748.
71. Id. at 343-44. Cf. Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, 178 (Can.) (finding that,
while there is a presumption against the application of laws beyond the realm tied to the
territoriality principle, jurisdiction may be taken over acts taking place in another state if a
sufficient portion of the activities constituting the offense took place in Canada, providing a
"real and substantial link" between the extraterritorial offense and the regulating state). The
Supreme Court of Canada found that such a link existed in a criminal fraud case concerning
telephone sales solicitations originating in Toronto and made to U.S. residents for the purpose
of inducing them to buy shares in purported gold mining companies in Costa Rica, with
money for the shares sent to associates of the accused in Central America. Id. at 210-14. See
also Seck, supra note 27, at 153.
72. Lowe, supra note 42, at 344-45 (arguing that U.S. reliance upon the effects doctrine has
been foremost in the antitrust context, and noting that the claim that other states have relied
upon the effects doctrine is not entirely accurate because these laws usually only apply where
there is "some element of intraterritorial conduct").
73. ZERK, supra note 18, at 110 (citing the work of the Australian Parliamentary Committee
examining Bill 2000).
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Whether conduct comes within state territorial jurisdiction thus
depends in part on what is understood to comprise the conduct or
activities. 74 For example, a decision made in Canada by a branch of the
Canadian government to contribute financially to a mining development in
another country could be considered an activity that takes place in Canada,
although the mining development itself would take place outside of
Accordingly, legislation mandating human rights or
Canada.
environmental requirements on financing decisions made by Export
Development Canada (EDC), Canada's export credit agency, would fall
within Canadian territorial jurisdiction. Similarly, a decision made in
Canada by a Canadian private bank to finance or insure an overseas
mining project (or not to finance the project, as the case may be) could be
considered an activity that takes place within Canadian territorial
jurisdiction. In an analysis of the territoriality of decision-making, there is
no distinction between financing by the Canadian government and
financing by a private Canadian financial institution. This suggests that, as
a preliminary matter, it is permissible for a home state government to
regulate both its own export credit agency and private financial institutions
that make decisions within its territory. 75 These mechanisms could then
serve indirectly to regulate the international activities of companies that
rely on these services.
A similar argument could be made with regard to regulation imposed
directly through corporate law. If corporate law can be used to influence
decisions made in Canada, 76 then the territoriality principle again provides
a connecting factor on the assumption that Canadian-based (incorporated)
Companies incorporated in
companies make decisions in Canada. 7
Canada but headquartered abroad and managed by non-residents pose a
challenge to the territorial decision-making presumption, as it cannot
obviously be presumed that they make decisions in Canada. 78 On the other
hand, corporations organized under foreign state laws that have their
registered main office or principle place of business in Canada could be
presumed to make decisions in Canada. 79
Requirements imposed through securities regulation or stock exchange
listing requirements may require a different justification from corporate
law, as listing on a Canadian stock exchange does not require a company to
be based (incorporated) in Canada. 80 It might be presumed that a company
74. Lowe, supra note 42, at 353.
75. Indeed, both EDC and Canadian financial institutions already operate subject to
federal legislation. See, e.g., Export Development Act, R.S.C., ch. E 20 (1985); Bank Act, S.C.,
ch. 46 (1991).
76. Cf. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 11, at 3 (suggesting that "the Government of
Canada can influence companies that are headquartered in Canada").
77. Id. at 9 (stating that "the court must consider the facts that took place in Canada at the
corporate headquarters, for example, in the case of a Canadian company operating outside
Canada") (internal punctuation omitted).
78. Id.at 3.
79. This would accord with a determination of nationality in civil law jurisdictions. Lowe,
supra note 43, at 345-46.
80. See, e.g., TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE & TSX VENTURE EXCHANGE, LISTING
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listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) but incorporated in a foreign
country and without a Canadian headquarters would not make decisions
in Canada. Despite this, requiring a foreign company listed on a Canadian
stock exchange to comply with environmental and social disclosure
requirements could be justified on the basis of the effects doctrine. 81
The above analysis of the location of corporate decision-making may
seem overly simplistic given the transnational nature of decision-making in
the twenty-first century -both the internet and ease of transportation from
one country to another make a focus on territoriality in the world of
international business meaningless. 82 Despite this, the existence of
extensive professional expertise in global mining in key cities like Toronto,
and the use of this expertise by companies listing on Canadian stock
exchanges provide another territorial connection that is often overlooked. 83
Adopting a presumption that decision-making is territorially-based is
justified if corporations incorporated in Canada or listed on a Canadian
stock exchange take advantage of the professional expertise found in
Canadian mining centers, regardless of the location of their headquarters
or managers.84 This would not necessarily overcome concerns about the
potential effectiveness of the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction in this
REQUIREMENTS

FOR

EXPLORATION

AND

MINING

COMPANIES,

available

at

http://www.tsx.com/en/pdf/TSXandTSXVenture MiningListingRequirements.pdf.
81. In the U.S. context, the effects doctrine is an established test of jurisdiction under
federal securities laws.
H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998
Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government's Reach Now Exceed its
Grasp?, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 239, 330-31 (2001). Justification under the effects
doctrine would assume that Canadians who invest in securities sold on Canadian exchanges
would be negatively impacted by not having access to social and environmental information
in order to make their investment decisions. This also assumes that Canadians are the
investors.
82. This is particularly so given the polycentric nature of the corporate organization, as
even within one parent company, decisions of relevance could be made in multiple locations.
See Nancy T. Gallini & Aidan Hollis, A ContractualApproach to the Gray Market, 19 Int'l Rev. L.
& Econ. 1, 2 n.3 ("[Mlany multinational corporations are organized around subsidiaries or
head offices in each country that have substantial decision-making power for the local market;
this is the efficient means of organization.").
83. TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE & TSX VENTURE EXCHANGE, A GLOBAL RESOURCE FOR
CAPITAL 7-24 (2007), available at http://www.tsx.com/en/pdf/Mining._SectorSheet.pdf
(highlighting the fact that the TSX has the largest listing of mining companies in the world,
and describing its advantages for mining companies as including the "largest peer group in
the world," "mining expertise" and "trading and investing depth," "the large analyst
community that covers both seniors and juniors," and the ability "to finance international
projects even in high risk places").
See also TSX Oil and Gas Listings Page,
http://www.tsx.com/en/listings/sector-profiles/oil-gas.html (last visited June 6, 2008)
(highlighting the fact that the TSX has the largest listing of oil and gas companies in the
world).
84. By adopting such a presumption, I mean to suggest that Canadian legislators could
rely upon the territoriality principle to regulate the human rights and environmental conduct
of mining companies whether through Canadian securities or corporate law. Such legislation
could be structured to simply apply in all cases, or could be structured with a rebuttable
presumption that the relevant decision was made in Canada, as opposed to applying only to
decisions made in Canada. See generally Andy Hoffman, China Mines Canadian Advice, GLOBE
& MAIL, Jan. 7, 2008, at B3 (emphasizing the importance of Toronto-based bankers and
lawyers to state-owned Chinese firms bidding for foreign mining companies).
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context, unless corporate law or listing requirements mandated sufficient
territorial links for effective enforcement. 85 Alternately, enforcement could
86
be linked to the conduct of Canadian-based professionals.
B.

The Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflicts

The preceding section suggests that in principle a home state could
justify the regulation of transnational corporate conduct under either the
nationality or territoriality principle, with the territoriality principle
ultimately providing a more satisfactory justification. However, the real
issue is whether the exercise of jurisdiction by a home state conflicts with
the exercise of jurisdiction by another state-perhaps most importantly,
that of the host state. Concurrent or overlapping jurisdiction arises when
more than one state regulates the same transnational conduct in accordance
with established jurisdictional principles. 87
Incidents of concurrent
jurisdiction are not unusual.
Indeed they are quite normal, even
commonplace.8 8 Objections to jurisdiction may arise where one state
perceives the assumption of jurisdiction by a second state as involving
unwarranted interference in matters which have little or nothing to do with
that second state and are more properly the concern of the first state.8 9 This
unwarranted interference is generally thought of as contravening the
fundamental international law principle of non-intervention or noninterference, which is breached "by an assertion of jurisdiction which
interferes with another state's political, economic, social or cultural
system." 90 The question, then, is how to resolve contested situations of
concurrent jurisdiction. In a true conflict, it is impossible to comply with
the laws of both forums at the same time. Thus, compliance with the law
of one forum results in violation of the law of the other forum. 91 It is
85. For example, if enforcement difficulties are created by corporate laws that allow for
incorporation in Canada without any Canadian directors or officers, then these laws should be
changed. See, e.g., Yukon Business Corporations Act (YBCA), R.S.Y., ch. 20 (2002) (Can.).
86. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 192-244 (2006).

87. Lowe, supra note 42, at 354.
88. D.W. Bowett, Jurisdiction:Changing Patternsof Authority Over Activities and Resources, in
THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
DOCTRINE AND THEORY 555, 565 (R. St. J. Macdonald & Douglas Johnston eds., 1983). See also
OPPENHEIM, supra note 43 ("In practice... it is only in relatively few cases that overlapping

claims to jurisdiction cause serious problems, usually where the states concerned attach
importance to the assertion of their competing claims ... Usually the coexistence of
overlapping jurisdiction is acceptable and convenient"); WALLACE, supra note 55, at 590
(describing jurisdictional conflicts as "inevitable wherever a serious conflict of interests arises
between the law and policy of the home state and that of the host"); ZERK, supra note 18, at 133
("The presence of multinationals makes jurisdictional conflicts between states inevitable.").
89. Bowett, supra note 88, at 565.
90. Id. at 566. See also ZERK, supra note 18, at 105 ("[Slo far as social and environmental
regulation is concerned, indirect or 'parent-based' forms of extraterritorial regulation are
generally permitted, provided they do not violate the international law duty of 'nonintervention"').
91. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol11/iss1/10
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clearly not acceptable for a home state to require a company in the host
state to break host state law, even if this is done indirectly through the
parent company. 92 However, even where the laws in question do not
create a true conflict, the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by a home state
may still be viewed as intrusive by a host state, particularly if the subject
matter touches on matters that are considered central to the "very idea" of
93
state sovereignty.
This leads to a third possible justification for the exercise of home state
jurisdiction under international law, the principle of universal jurisdiction.
Universal jurisdiction is concerned first and foremost with the subject
matter that is being regulated, thus violations of international criminal law
norms are considered to be sufficiently serious that any state can and even
should exercise jurisdiction to bring perpetrators to justice, no matter
where in the world the crimes were committed. 94 This basis of jurisdiction
provides additional justification for existing home state legislation that in
theory could lead to the prosecution of transnational corporations for
complicity in egregious human rights violations. 95
Despite this, Canada appears reluctant to prosecute corporations
criminally, as evident from both the Talisman and Anvil Mining examples
above. The reluctance to prosecute Anvil may be due to the fact that a
(explaining that an "intuitively acceptable" definition of a conflict as "between two rules
requiring or prohibiting actions is to be understood in terms of the logical possibility of joint
obedience to them. Two such rules conflict if and only if obedience to them both . . . is
logically impossible"). According to this definition, a home state law that prohibited home
state gold mining companies from using cyanide in global mining operations would not
conflict with a host state law that required cyanide use to be in compliance with the UNEP
International Cyanide Management Code, nor with a host state that had no law in place on
the use of cyanide in gold mining. In both cases, if the company did not use cyanide, it would
not breach host state law. The home state prohibition would, however, conflict with a host
state law explicitly requiring cyanide use in gold mining.
92. WALLACE, supra note 55, at 590; Mann, supra note 60, at 59-63.
93. Cf. Craig Scott, Translating Torture into Transnational Tort: Conceptual Divides in the
Debate on Corporate Accountabilityfor Human Rights Harms, in TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT'S LITIGATION 45, 53

(Craig Scott ed., 2001) (arguing that the more extraterritorial regulation moves away from
matters of common criminality to matters of economic policy, the greater sensitivity states
feel, because of the "dominant view that economic policy belongs in some more intrinsic way
to the very idea of sovereignty"). See also U.N. Conference on Environment and Development,
June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 21, 8, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992) (Principle 2) (providing support in the environmental
context for host state conceptions of state sovereignty).
94. THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 259 (2006) ("Some

international obligations are.., so basic that they run equally to all other States, and every
State has the right to demand respect for those obligations"). Cf. Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 l.C.J. Rep. 3, at 76-77 (Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal); DE SCHUTTER REPORT, supra note 45, at 15. See
generally MERON, supra, at 256-70, 392-98 (2006) (discussing the relationship among jus cogens
norms, ergo omnes obligations, and international crimes; citing Giorgio Gaja's description of
this relationship as a "set of three overlapping, concentric circles" which permits any state to
regulate to ensure compliance with and punish violators of these norms); LUC REYDAMS,
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 28-42 (2003)

(providing an overview of theories of universal jurisdiction).
95. RAMASASTRY & THOMPSON,

supra note 29, at 16-17.
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military court in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has already tried
and acquitted three of Anvil's employees. A Canadian prosecution of the
same employees could give rise to a situation of double jeopardy, although
this would not be the case if Canada were to prosecute the corporation
itself.9 6 In the Talisman case, the reason for the reluctance to prosecute is
less clear. What is clear is that Canada's interventions in support of
Talisman in the private law tort action in the state of New York would be
less controversial if either criminal prosecution or a parallel civil action
97
were underway in Canadian courts.
Many matters of concern to local communities impacted by global
mining are not violations of international criminal law or matters of
universal jurisdiction, but rather involve the realization of indigenous or
local community rights to have a say in whether or how global mining is to
be carried out, and to seek remediation in the event that global mining
activities cause harm. 98 These concerns touch upon economic, social, and
cultural rights; environmental rights; indigenous rights; and the right to
development. 99 Accordingly, home state regulation of these matters is
more likely to be perceived as infringing host state sovereignty than is
home state legislation that addresses an international criminal law norm.
Thus, a critical question in the extractive industries context is how to
address potential problems that might arise in the exercise of concurrent
jurisdiction over non-egregious human rights violations. Returning to first
principles, the starting point must be that the exercise of concurrent
jurisdiction is not unusual, but commonplace, particularly with regard to
activities involving transnational corporations. With this understanding,
the question becomes how to satisfactorily resolve jurisdictional disputes,
or, more precisely, how to minimize host state perceptions of
impermissible intervention. 10 0 The resolution of jurisdictional "conflicts" is
96. McBeth, supra note 28. This is not to say that Canada should refrain from prosecuting
Anvil in light of the due process concerns that have arisen in relation to the military court
trial. See generally GLOBAL WITNESS ET AL., supra note 28. See also Libman, supra note 71, at 212
(holding that Canadian courts make use of the principles of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict
to take cognizance of acquittals and convictions in other jurisdictions for the same conduct).
97. This is not to say that the interventions would be acceptable in either of these
As it is, Canada's
circumstances, merely that they would be easier to understand.
interventions amount to an insistence that Canada wants the United States to refrain from
exercising jurisdiction over Talisman, so that Canada can exercise its jurisdiction to do
nothing free from outside interference.
98. See generally COMMUNITY RIGHTS AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 36. On

Peru, see Lisa J. Laplante & Suzanne A. Spears, Out of the Conflict Zone: The CaseforCommunity
Consent Processes in the Extractive Sector, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 69 (2008).
99. These rights may be viewed as people's rights. See generally PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (Philip
22-30 (discussing the distinction
Alston ed., 2001); Ruggie Report 2007, supra note 12,
between international criminal law norms and other human rights norms in relation to direct
corporation obligations under international law); Craig Scott, The Interdependence and
Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards A Partial Fusion of the InternationalCovenants on
Human Rights, 27 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 769, 771-72 (1989) (examining the interdependence of
human rights).
100. Perhaps the better question is how to minimize the reliance of home states upon the
principle of non-intervention as a justification for inaction. See ZERK, supra note 18, at 136
(describing international statements of the principle of non-intervention as "deliberately
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frequently said to depend upon a test of reasonableness involving a
balancing of state interests, which includes consideration of links to the
territory of the regulating state, and the importance of the regulation to the
international system.101
A related approach to the resolution of jurisdictional conflicts is
through recourse to notions of shared international interests. 102 As August
Reinisch notes:
States are using their extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to enforce
not (only) their own policy goals, but also international ones. Of
course, one has to be very careful in assessing whether states truly
enforce international law or whether they use this as a pretext to
103
pursue their own national policies.
To the extent that some cases may validly be described as attempting
to enforce international human rights norms through national legal
systems, the issue becomes a clash of substantive international law
principles relating to human rights, and formal international law principles
relating to jurisdiction. 1°4 Reinisch suggests that in this case, "'substance'
might override 'form"', as "affected states will have a hard time justifying
their disregard of human rights in rejecting the extraterritorial acts of
others."105
woolly" and nearly "impossible to interpret" in the globalization context).
101. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
403 (1987); ZERK, supra note 18, at 136-39; Bowett, supra note 79, at 566-72; DE SCHUTTER
REPORT, supra note 45, at 27. Among the factors considered in the Restatement's
reasonableness test are: the links to the territory of the regulating state; the character of the
activity being regulated; its importance to the regulating state; the extent to which other states
regulate the activity; whether such regulation is considered desirable; and the importance of
the regulation to the international system.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (as

discussed in LOWENFELD, supra note 44, at 18-19).
102. See, e.g., August Reinisch, The Changing InternationalLegal Frameworkfor Dealing with
Non-State Actors, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 37, 58 (Philip Alston ed., 2005).
See also ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT

77 (1994) (arguing that "the key issue lies in the protection of common values rather than the
invocation of state sovereignty for its own sake.., the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
to protect common values to that end seems to me as acceptable as other non-territorial
bases"); DE SCHUTTER REPORT, supra note 45, at 27 (arguing that a reasonable exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction to protect human rights in a host state cannot "fall under the
category of forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction which primarily benefit the State, thus
extending the reach of its national laws," and instead must be "justified in the name of
international solidarity").
103. Reinisch, supra note 102. See also ZERK, supra note 18, at 137-38.
104. Reinisch, supra note 102.
105. Id. Reinisch continues:
While international law only provided a value-neutral framework within
which states were free to adopt and pursue their own policy through
legislation, each state could easily defend its own sovereign right to
determine its own policies and thus to legislate and remain unaffected by
the legislation of other states. The growing convergence of policies, or at
least the increasing substantive determination of national policy choices
through international law, for our purposes the increasing pressure to
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It thus becomes important to examine the substance of the
international norms that home state regulation might address. Ultimately,
according to Lowe: "Where other States consider that a jurisdictional claim
has gone too far.., they will protest. Those protests generally hold
jurisdictional claims within reasonable bounds. If other States choose to
06
acquiesce in the claim, it will become established in customary law."'
IV. HOME STATE OBLIGATIONS

A. Sustainable Mineral Development and the Three Pillars of Public
Participation
Unlike other renewable resources such as forestry and fisheries, "there
is no global governance regime or extensive statement of principles for
mining or mineral resources."10 7
However, many multilateral
environmental agreements do have an impact on the minerals industry, as
do many other sources of international environmental law.108 Moreover, in
recent years, sustainable development has become the mantra of the global
mining industry, with a focus on sustainable development changing both
corporate strategies and the "goals and objectives of mining law reform."1" 9
Indeed, while the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and
Agenda 21 did not directly address the mining industry," 0 the Commission
on Sustainable Development, the United Nations body established to
oversee its implementation, later listed "mineral, metals and rehabilitation
fulfil [sic] human rights obligations by enacting implementing legislation,
has weakened the shield of national sovereignty and territorial
jurisdiction.
Id. at 58-59.
106. Lowe, supra note 42, at 354. Protest could take the form of blocking legislation, a
fairly common occurrence in relation to perceived jurisdictional overreaches relating to
transnational corporations. See, e.g., LOWENFELD, supra note 44, at 166-79; WALLACE, supra
note 55, at 617-22. While Lowenfeld considers blocking statutes to represent "the opposite...
of accommodation, reasonableness, balancing of interests, [and] 'comity,'" he arguably
overlooks the usefulness of blocking statutes as tools of communication between states that
ultimately reveal the existence of common purposes by exposing existing impediments to
their realization. LOWENFELD, supra note 44, at 153.
107. Maria Cecilia G. Dalupan, Mining and Sustainable Development: Insights from
InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE MINERAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note

62, at 155.
108. George (Rock) Pring, James Otto & Koh Naito, Trends in InternationalLaw Affecting the
Minerals Industry (Pt. 1), 17 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 39 (1999) & George (Rock) Pring,
James Otto & Koh Naito, Trends in InternationalLaw Affecting the Minerals Industry (Pt. II), 17 J.
ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 151 (1999) (dividing the analysis into trends that affect access to
land, the implementation of process operations, or the sale of end products and waste
commodities).
109. John P. Williams, Legal Reform in Mining: Past, Present, and Future, in INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE MINERAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 61, at 37, 62.

See also David

Humphreys, Corporate Strategies in the Global Mining Industry, in INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE MINERAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 61, at 451, 463-66.

110. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol11/iss1/10
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in the context of sustainable development" as a priority area for future
work." 1
The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on
Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002 does explicitly
address mining, stating in part that "[mlining, minerals and metals are
important to the economic and social development of many countries", and
that "[m]inerals are essential for modem living."" 2 This agreed-upon text
was condemned by environmentalists and affected community
representatives, who boycotted the WSSD process several days into
PrepCom IV in Bali, Indonesia in protest." 3 Among the complaints were
the sense that the statement that "minerals are essential for modern living"
was "skewed towards the satisfaction of the consumption patterns of the
north,"" 4 and that participation in the WSSD process was not furthering
their struggles for human rights and ecological justice." 5 Mining will be on
the agenda of the 2010/11 meeting of the Commission on Sustainable
Development, a meeting that the Canadian government is actively
preparing for in part through its central role in the Intergovernmental
Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development." 6
The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation lists three specific actions
designed to enhance the contribution of mining, minerals and metals to
sustainable development.1 7 The second action focuses upon the need to
"[e]nhance the participation of stakeholders, including local and
indigenous communities and women, to play an active role in minerals,
metals, and mining development."'" 8 This focus is in keeping with what
has been described as perhaps the most significant trend in sustainable
111. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOCI, Comm. on Sustainable Dev., Report on the
Eighth Session,
4, 25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.17/2000/20 (April 24-May 5, 2000).
112. World Summit on Sustainable Development, Aug. 25-Sept. 4, 2002, Johannesburg
Declaration on Sustainable Development and Plan of Implementation, 37, UN Doc.
A/CONF.199/20 [hereinafter Johannesburg Plan of Implementation].
113. Project Underground, Affected Communities and Non-Governmental Organizations
Boycott the WSSD, DRILLBITS & TAILINGS (Project Underground, Berkeley, Cal.), June 30, 2002,
http://lists.topica.com/lists/englishdrilbits/ read/message.html?sort=&mid=803599138 (last
visited Apr. 11, 2008); Statement, Participants of the International Mining Workshop, No Tears
for the WSSD (June 4, 2002), availableat
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press43.htm. According to members of the
Africa Initiative on Mining, Environment and Society (AIMES), the Canadian delegation at the
Bali PrepCom were "among the architects of the mining section", and were alleged to have
been one of the official delegations for whom mining was a "non-negotiable issue", unless the
outcome could be reworked to "promote increased mining within the framework of voluntary
codes and high privileges for companies." Statement by AIMES on Mining (June5, 2002),
availableat http://twnafrica.org/news-detail.asp?twnlD=229.
114. AIMES, supra note 113.
115. No Tears for the WSSD, supra note 113. However, the Johannesburg Plan of
Implementation as a whole has been described as noteworthy for treating poverty and
unsustainable production and consumption patterns as cross-cutting issues. MARIE-CLAIRE
CORDONIER SEGGER & ASHFAQ KHALFAN,
PRACTICES, & PROSPECTS 29 (2004).

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW: PRINCIPLES,

116. Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development
Home Page, http://www.globaldialogue.info (last visited June 6, 2008).
117. Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, supra note 112, at 37.
118. Id. at 37.
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mineral development: the increasing recognition of the right of local
communities, especially but not exclusively indigenous peoples, to
participate in decision-making relating to mineral development." 9
The three "pillars" of public participation rights are access to
information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice
in environmental matters. 120 Together, they form an integral part of
international sustainable development law. 121 While each pillar is separate
and distinct, "no one of the three can succeed without the other two."' 22 As
Pring and No6 note, "a considerable amount of the public-participation law
arises in response to and therefore specifically applies to the mining,
energy, and natural resources industries."' 23 Moreover, as many issues
have "transboundary or multi-state impacts," a significant consideration is
the extent to which the three pillars apply to "nationals of countries other
124
than the decision-making country."
Numerous international environmental law and sustainable
development law sources provide support for the three pillars of public
Public participation is often a component of an
participation. 25
119. George (Rock) Pring & Susan Y. No6, The Emerging International Law of Public
ParticipationAffecting Global Mining, Energy and Resources Development, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

OF MINING AND ENERGY RESOURCES 11, 12 (Donald N. Zillman, Alastair R. Lucas & George
(Rock) Pring eds., 2002) ("Public participation promises to define and redefine the major
economic development projects of the Twenty-First Century-and few sectors will be more
impacted on by this than the mining, energy, and resources-development industries.").
120. Id. at 28. The right to access information places both a reactive duty and a proactive
duty upon governments who must both respond to requests for information and "compile,
prepare, and disseminate" certain information to the public without first being asked. Id. at
29-30. The right of public participation in decision-making has emerged both through
environmental assessment processes, and new laws that impact other processes of decisionmaking. This pillar is particularly significant for mining development, serving to "inject new
'players'-citizens, NGOs, indigenous peoples' interests, local communities, etc. - and
therefore new challenges into ... decision-making that were previously the province only of
the project developer, landowner, financier, and government officialdom." Id. at 37, 38.
Finally, access to justice needs arise in three distinct situations: first, to challenge a refusal to
provide access to information; second, to prevent or seek damages related to harmful
activities; and third, to directly enforce existing environmental laws. Id. at 44.
121. Id. at 28; SEGGER & KHALFAN, supra note 115, at 101, 156-66.
122. Pring & No6, supra note 120, at 28.
123. Id. See also Barry Barton, Underlying Concepts and Theoretical Issues in Public
Participation in Resources Development, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATURAL RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 119 at 77 (noting that "the extent to which there should be
participation, and how it should occur, go straight to the heart of a nation's political values").
For rationales and critiques of public participation, see Barton, supra, at 99-109; Pring & No6,
supra note 119, at 22-26; Benjamin J. Richardson & Jona Razzaque, Public Participation in
Environmental Decision-making, in ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY 165, 191-94

(Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood eds., 2006).
124. Pring & No@, supra note 119, at 28-29. Accordingly, the principle of nondiscrimination is often used in this context, along with equal access and national treatment.
125. Id. at 27-50. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. Comm. for Eur., June 23-25, 1998, Aarhus Convention
on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters, U.N. Doc. ECE/CEP/43 (Oct. 30, 2001). Accord I EMIL SALIM, STRIKING
A BETTER BALANCE 24 (2003), available at http://go.worldbank.org/380ODLX6N0 (citing the
three pillars as set out in the Aarhus Convention as providing a "long-term model for
addressing community access to grievance mechanisms"); Pring & No6, supra note 119, at 36
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environmental impact assessment (EIA), so international law sources
mandating EIA processes often make reference to public participation
rights. 126 Support for public participation rights are found in the practices
of international financial institutions, 127 Equator Principles financial
institutions, 12 and export credit agencies. 129
Support for the three pillars of public participation is also found in
many sources of international human rights law. 30
Of particular
significance in the global mining context is that local communities,
especially indigenous communities, are often said to have a right to free,
prior and informed consent 3' with regard to development projects that
could affect local community rights. 132 Another formulation of the public
(quoting former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan as saying that, while the Aarhus
Convention is regional in scope, it is global in significance, "by far the most impressive
elaboration of principle 10 of the Rio Declaration," and the "most ambitious venture in the
area of 'environmental democracy' so far undertaken under the auspices of the United
Nations").
126. See Pring and No6, supra note 120, at 38-43. Most countries around the world require
EIA as a national instrument for proposed projects, although there is a huge variation in the
number and type of assessments carried out, and in the degree of public participation. See,
e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION COUNTRIES (Norman Lee
& Clive George eds., 2000).
127. See, e.g., WORLD BANK GROUP, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION'S PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON SOCIAL &
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 1-6, 28-32 (Apr. 30, 2006), available at

http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/Content/PerformanceStandards (providing for free,
prior, and informed consultation with indigenous peoples).
128. The EquatorPrinciples (July 2006), availableat
http://www.equator-principles.com/documents/Equator-Principles.pdf.
129. Org. of Econ. Co-operation and Dev. (OECD), Trade and Agriculture Directorate,
Trade Committee, Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees, Revised Council
Recommendation on Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits
(June 12, 2007), available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2007doc.nsf/linkto/tadecg(2007)9.
130. See Pring & No6, supra note 119, at 50-52.
131. Whether this is a right of indigenous peoples alone or of both indigenous and local
communities is contested, as is whether they have a right to free, prior and informed consent,
or to free, prior and informed consultation. See FOREST PEOPLES PROGRAMME & TEBTEBBA
FOUNDATION, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' RIGHTS, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND TRANSNATIONAL
AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, A SUBMISSION TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES
45-54
(2006),
available
at
http://www.business-

humanrights.org/Documents/Forest-Peoples-Tebtebba-submission-to-SRSG-re-indigenousrights-29-Dec-2006.pdf.
The distinction between consultation and consent has been
controversial at the World Bank. CompareSALIM, supra note 125, at 21, 50 (supporting consent)
with WORLD BANK GROUP MANAGEMENT, STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE: WORLD BANK GROUP
MANAGEMENT RESPONSE 7 (2004) (supporting consultation).
132. U.N. Hum. Rts. Coun., Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
issue of human rights and transnationalcorporationsand other business enterprises:Addendum: State
responsibilities to regulate and adjudicate corporate activities under the United Nations core human
rights treaties,
46, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35/Add.1 (Feb. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Ruggie
Addendum 11 (referring to the recommendations of the UN human rights treaty bodies). The
most recent statement of this principle is the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.. A/RES/61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007), adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly in September 2007. Canada was one of only four countries voting against
the Declaration.
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participation pillars may be found in the 1986 Declaration on the Right to
Development 133 which has subsequently been reaffirmed as an "integral
part of fundamental human rights." 134
B. An Obligation of Home States
Having established that the three pillars of public participation have
support in sources of international law of significance to global mining, the
question remains as to whether home states are obligated to ensure that the
participation rights of local communities in host states are respected. The
Declaration on the Right to Development is potentially helpful in this
regard, for Article 2(3) formulates the right as both a right and duty of
states, with the state holding the right as an agent for the individuals and
the entire population. 135 This suggests that the state right to development
must be exercisable against outside actors, including conceivably a home
state. 36 Moreover, states have the duty "individually and collectively" to
facilitate the full realization of the right to development in the formation of
development policies, while states must also take steps to eliminate
obstacles to development resulting from the failure to observe other human
rights. 1 37 Taken together, it is clearly possible to argue that home states as
well as host states must ensure that the three pillars of rights of
participation in development are fully protected.
The more recent
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples also provides support for
a home state obligation, both "before adopting and implementing
legislative or administrative measures that may affect [indigenous
peoples]," 1 3s and "prior to the approval of any project... affecting their
139
land" in relation to the development of mineral resources.
133. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128 Annex, at 186, U.N.
GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (Dec. 4, 1986).
134. Anne Orford, Globalization and the Right to Development, in PEOPLE'S RIGHTS 127, 13134 (Philip Alston ed., 2001). See also Scott, supra note 99, at 824 (stating that the right to
development may be viewed at least in part as a "synthetic right premised on the
interdependence of existing human rights," and that "[plarticipation, which entails the active
exercise of a whole cluster of civil and political rights, is practically a leitmotif of the
Declaration").
135. Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 134. See also Orford, supra note
135, at 137 (describing the rights and duties of states under Article 2(3) as working to
"formulate appropriate national development policies" with a goal to "constant improvement
of the well-being of the entire population and all individuals, on the basis of their active, free
and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits
resulting therefrom").
136. Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 133, at 186-87. See also Orford,
supra note 135, at 141-44 (citing Articles 2(3) and 8 without mentioning home states, but
suggesting that the Declaration provides that the right could be exercised against
transnational companies or international institutions, as well as other powerful states).
137. Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 133, at 187. See also Orford,
supra note 134, at 142 (citing Articles 4(1) and 6(3)).
138. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 132, at 6. In this case, the
obligation attaches to "states."
139. Id. at 9. Many other provisions of the Declaration are also relevant. Given the length
of time involved in the drafting of the Declaration and the amount of attention and effort
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A second source of support for home state obligations lies in
recommendations of human rights treaty bodies with regard to the
regulation and adjudication of human rights violations by transnational
corporations. The state duty to protect against non-state actor human
rights abuses requires states to take steps to "regulate and adjudicate
abuses by all social actors, including businesses." 140 The treaty bodies
frequently specifically recommend that states take steps to regulate and
adjudicate the acts of mining and extractive companies. 141
The
recommendations generally concern "regulation through legislation and
adjudication through judicial remedies, including compensation where
appropriate." 142 Moreover, states may breach their obligations "whether
they permit or fail to take appropriate measures or to exercise due
diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by
such acts by private persons or entities." 143 In light of the analysis earlier in
this Part, it could be said that obligations to prevent and redress harm can
only be implemented in the mineral development context if the three
pillars of public participation have also been implemented. Accordingly,
the state obligation to regulate and adjudicate business must include the
obligation to implement the three pillars of public participation.
While the treaty bodies have clearly stated that the duty to protect
applies to host states, the duty has not been clearly articulated in relation to
home states, although the treaty bodies also do not interpret their treaties
so as to prohibit the exercise of home state jurisdiction.'" Moreover, the
treaty bodies do appear to be increasingly suggesting that a role does exist
for home states in relation to the duty to protect. 45 Indeed, in March 2007,
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) noted
given to it by states as well as by indigenous peoples, it is of considerable weight. Stefan
Matiation & Jos~e Boudreau, Making a Difference: The Canadian Duty to Consult and Emerging
InternationalNorms Respecting Consultation with Indigenous Peoples, in THE GLOBALIZED RULE OF
LAW 397, 423-26 (Oonagh Fitzgerald ed., 2006).
140. Ruggie Report 2007, supra note 12, 1 10 (stating that the duty to protect is found
under core U.N. human rights treaties as elaborated by the treaty bodies, and its content has
been unanimously affirmed by the treaty bodies). See also Ruggie Addendum 1, supra note
132, 1 7 ("The duty to protect includes preventing corporations-both national and
transnational, publicly or privately owned-from breaching rights and taking steps to punish
them and provide reparation to victims when they do so"). The state duty to protect against
non-state actor human rights abuses has also been affirmed by the regional human rights
systems with similar requirements established for states to "regulate and adjudicate corporate
acts." Ruggie Report 2007, 7 16.
141. Ruggie Addendum 1, supra note 132, 11 30, 45-46.
142. Ruggie Report 2007, supra note 12, 14.
143. Id. 7 13 (internal punctuation omitted). The concept of due diligence is not used
explicitly by all treaty bodies. Ruggie Addendum 1, supra note 132, T 9.
144. Ruggie Report 2007, supra note 12, 7 15; Ruggie Addendum 1, supra note 132, 11 8492.
145. Ruggie Report 2007, supra note 12, at n.9. For example, the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights has indicated that states should "take steps to 'prevent their own
citizens and companies' from violating the right to water of individuals and communities in
other countries." U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rts., General Comment No. 15: The right to water, 1 33, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20,
2003); Ruggie Addendum 1, supra note 132, 11 86-87.
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in its Concluding Observations on Canada that the CERD
encourages the State party to take appropriate legislative or
administrative measures to prevent acts of transnational
corporations registered in Canada which negatively impact on the
enjoyment of rights of indigenous peoples in territories outside
Canada. In particular, the Committee recommends that the State
party explore ways to hold transnational corporations registered in
46
Canada accountable.
Interestingly, these comments were made after the CERD had received
submissions from indigenous peoples in the United States complaining
about the conduct of Canadian mining companies on indigenous lands in
the United States. 47 This would suggest that the role of home states in
assisting host states to comply with international human rights obligations
should not be conceived of as one that revolves around rich home states
and poor incapacitated host states, particularly in the extractive industries
context. Indeed, large-scale mineral extraction by its very nature pits
central governments hungry for the financial returns of mineral investment
against rural, often poor, often politically disempowered and internally
divided local communities who bear the brunt of mining's impacts. This is
equally true of rich and poor states.
A third source of support for home state obligations is by analogy to
the International Law Commission's (ILC) work on the prevention and
reparation of transboundary environmental harm.
While initially
conceived of as secondary rules of liability, 48 both the ILC's Draft Articles
on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities149 and the
Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm
Arising Out of Hazardous Activities150 are better understood as primary
146. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention: Concluding observations of the
Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 17, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/CAN/CO/18
(March 5, 2007).
147. WESTERN SHOSHONE DEFENSE PROJECT, REPORT ON EFFECTS OF CANADIAN
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE ACTIVITIES ON THE WESTERN SHOSHONE PEOPLES OF THE WESTERN
SHOSHONE NATION, REPORT SUBMITTED TO CERD IN RELATION TO CANADA'S 17TH AND 18TH

PERIODIc REPORTS TO CERD, 4 (2007). The Western Shoshone lands are in California, Idaho,
Nevada, and Utah. Id.
148. See, e.g., A.E. Boyle, State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious
Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?, 39 INT'L &
COMP. L. Q. 1, 24 (1990) (arguing that the "principle of causal liability provides a largely novel
basis for reparation complementing State responsibility or operating in cases where
responsibility does not arise"). On the conceptual difference between state liability and state
responsibility, see XUE HANQIN, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 75-76
(2003).
149. Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the International Law Commission: Fifty-third Session, 366436, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Aug. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Prevention Articles].
150. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary
Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities, 101-82, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006) [hereinafter Loss
Allocation Principles].
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rules.' 5' According to the ILC, a "state of origin" is under an obligation to
exercise due diligence to prevent harm in other states by taking necessary
legislative, administrative or other action. 15 2 The state of origin is also
required to provide the "public likely to be affected" with relevant
information, and to "ascertain their views."' 5 3 Furthermore, access to
justice in state of origin courts is to be provided to affected citizens of other
states in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination.15 4 The ILC's
early work in this area conceived of the scope as applying to both
transboundary environmental harm and transnational harm associated
55
with the export of hazardous technology by transnational corporations.
While the wording of the scope of the Prevention Articles now suggests
that transboundary harm was at the forefront of the drafters' thoughts, it is
still possible to read both the ILC Prevention Articles and Loss Allocation
Principles as encompassing transnational harm.'% Thus, support could be
found for home state obligations by analogy with the ILC's work on the
prevention and remediation of transboundary harm.
Finally, support for home state obligations can also be found through a
better understanding of the attribution rules of the ILC's Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts ("Draft Articles on
Responsibility"). 5 7
Generally speaking, discussions of home state
responsibility have focused upon the question of how to attribute corporate
conduct directly to the state, and concluded that this is conceptually
difficult in the absence of an agency relationship between the state and the
corporate actor.1 8 However, a better approach would be to focus on the
151. Loss Allocation Principles,supra note 150, at 118.
152. Prevention Articles, supra note 149, at 372-73. A "state of origin" is defined as a state
"in the territory or otherwise under the jurisdiction or control of which the activities referred
to in draft article 1 are planned or carried out." Id. at 371.
153. Id. at 375.
154. Id. However, states may agree on alternate means of providing protection or redress
to persons who may suffer significant harm. See Principle 6(1) of the Loss Allocation Principles,
supra note 151 (providing that states "shall provide their domestic judicial and administrative
bodies with the necessary jurisdiction and competence and ensure that these bodies have
prompt, adequate and effective remedies available in the event of transboundary damage
caused by hazardous activities located within their territory or otherwise under their
jurisdiction or control"). This goes beyond the non-discriminatory access of the Prevention
Articles. For a critique of an earlier version of the Loss Allocation Principles, see A.E. Boyle,
Globalising EnvironmentalLiability: The Interplayof National and InternationalLaw, 17 J. ENVTL. L.
3 (2005).
155. Shinya Murase, Perspectives from International Economic Law on Transnational
Environmental Issues, 253 REC. DEs COURS 287,396-98 (1995).
156. For a detailed analysis, see Sara L. Seck, Home State Obligations for the Prevention
and Remediation of Transnational Harm: Canada, Global Mining and Local Communities 290413 (Dec. 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University)
(on file with author). See also XUE, supra note 148 at 9-10 (discussing the distinction between
transnational harm and transboundary harm, which she describes as difficult to draw in
practice and not always reflective of reality).
157. Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 148, at 43-365.
158. Many scholars do not specifically state that an agency relationship is required, but
implicitly assume so by relying upon Articles 5 and 8 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility,
if, indeed, they address attribution at all. Article 5 attributes conduct of persons or entities
empowered by state law to exercise elements of governmental authority, id. at 44, while

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008

27

YALE
RIGHTS
& DEVELOPMENT
Yale Human
Rights HUMAN
and Development
Law Journal,
Vol. 11 [2008], Iss.L.J.
1, Art. 10

[Vol. 11

conduct of home state organs themselves, and whether or not their conduct
is in keeping with the home state duty to prevent and remedy human
rights violations by non-state actors. Article 4 of the Draft Articles on
Responsibility, which provides that "the conduct of any State organ shall
be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the
organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions..159
thus becomes crucially important. The argument here is as follows: under
the primary rules of international environmental and human rights law,
states are under a duty to regulate private actor conduct so as to prevent
harm and to provide a remedy if harm ensues. To the extent that home
states do not exercise due diligence to prevent harm and to the extent that
home states neither prosecute private actors that have caused harm nor
provide access to justice for the victims of harm, the home state has itself
160
engaged in wrongful conduct for which state responsibility is applicable.
Under the Draft Articles on Responsibility's principle of independent
responsibility, the home state may be viewed as directly responsible for its
own wrongful conduct - that is, for its failure to regulate, including its
failure to provide a remedy. However, the home state is not directly
responsible for the conduct of the private corporate actor.
This understanding of responsibility has been described by some
scholars as indirect responsibility for private actor conduct, 161 and by
others as responsibility under the separate delict theory, with the term
indirect responsibility reserved for historical cases of complicity or
condonation. 162 It has been suggested that as the distinction between direct
responsibility for private actor conduct and responsibility under the
separate delict theory has no significant consequences in terms of remedies
under both international environmental and human rights law, the analysis

Article 8 attributes conduct of a person or group who are "in fact acting on the instructions of,
or under the direction or control of" the state, id. at 45. See, e.g., NICOLA JAGERS, CORPORATE
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 139-75 (2002); XUE, supra note 149, at 73-80; ZERK, supra note 18;
Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, The Doctrineof State Responsibility as a Potential Means of Holding
PrivateActors Accountablefor Human Rights 5 MELB. J. INT'L L. 1 (2004); Olivier De Schutter, The
Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European Law, in NON-STATE
ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 227, 235-37 (Philip Alston, ed., 2005); Muthucumaraswamy
Sornarajah, Linking State Responsibilityfor Certain Harms Caused by CorporateNationals Abroad to
Civil Recourse in the Legal Systems of Home States, in TORTURE AS TORT 491 (Craig Scott ed.,
2001). More recent work has begun to focus attention on the attribution of conduct to state
organs such as export credit agencies either directly or through a complicity analysis. See, e.g.,
OZGOR CAN & SARA L. SECK, THE LEGAL OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND

EXPORT CREDIT AGENCIES (2006); Robert McCorquodale & Penelope Simons, Responsibility
Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for ExtraterritorialViolations by Corporations of International
Human Rights Law, 70 MODERN L. REV. 598 (2007).
159. Draft Articles on Responsibility, supra note 156, at 43-365.
160. Note that conduct encompasses actions and omissions.
161. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 93, at 4748.
162. See TAL BECKER, TERRORISM AND THE STATE: RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE

RESPONSIBILITY 11-42 (2006). According to Becker, state responsibility is engaged under the
separate delict theory for the state's own violation of a separate and distinct duty to exercise
due diligence in preventing and punishing a private offense, rather than for the private
conduct itself after it has either directly or indirectly been attributed to the state. Id. at 24.
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undertaken in these contexts has not always been rigorous. 163 Yet, for an
analysis of home state obligations, the distinction may be significant to the
extent that separate delict responsibility focuses attention on the territorial
conduct of state organs, rather than upon the extraterritorial conduct of
transnational corporate actors. 164
V. CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that there is an emerging obligation for home
states to regulate and adjudicate transnational mining corporations
through the implementation of the three pillars of public participation
rights. In contrast to the reluctance exhibited in the Canadian Government
Response, it is clearly permissible for home states to implement legislative
and adjudicative measures through home state institutional structures that
support and promote global mining. These institutional structures include
financing mechanisms such as stock exchanges, export credit agencies and
private financial institutions, as well as non-financing structures such as
trade commissioner services and even corporate laws.
What could this mean in practice? As an example, a precondition for
mining development project support by home state financing mechanisms
should be that local communities have received full information about the
proposed project and fully participated in decision-making in the host state
on whether or not the project is to go ahead. 65 The adequacy of such
participation might be measured by proof of an agreement between the
company, community, and local government as to the environmental
standards that are to govern the project, along with provision for ongoing
project monitoring throughout the life of the mine and plans for mine
closure. 166 Any such financing decisions might then be subject to judicial
review, with standing given to host state local communities in home states
courts to seek reconsideration of the financing decision if community
participation has been inadequate. If financing is sought for mineral
exploration, this too must be conditional upon ensuring that concrete plans
are in place to implement community participation rights at the earliest
possible stage. Finally, home state implementation of the access to justice
pillar of public participation rights must include ensuring that home state

163. Id. at 53, 62.
164. For an analysis of attribution under the secondary rules of state responsibility, see
Seck, supra note 157, at 196-289.
165. The importance of local community capacity to participate in this decision-making
cannot be underemphasized, along with the importance of the decision-making process itself
being defined from the ground-up by the community itself, rather than being imposed from
the outside in a pre-set form. See, e.g., the North-South Institute, Indigenous Perspectives on
Consultation and Decision-Making About Mining and Other Natural Resources in Latin
America, the Caribbean and Canada (Phase 1I) Project Description, http://www.nsiins.ca/english/research/progress/56.asp (last visited June 6, 2008).
166. Other signs of adequate participation might be an impact and benefit agreement and
the creation of an environmental monitoring agency with local community participation to
monitor agreed-upon standards.
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courts are able and willing to hear actions brought by host state local
communities in home state courts against transnational mining
corporations, absent evidence that the local community and company have
mutually agreed on another forum that is able and willing to hear the
claim.
If host states were to find this type of legislation intrusive, they could
protest, perhaps through the implementation of blocking statutes, the
67
This
ultimate power advantage conferred by territorial jurisdiction.'
would require a host state to explicitly state that it does not want local
communities to participate in decisions relating to mining development.
Alternately, protest could take the form of host state refusal to cooperate
should a home state find that full implementation of the participation
rights requires the exercise of investigative jurisdiction in cooperation with
host state officials on host state soil.
Should implementation of
participation rights prove impossible in conflict zones or undemocratic
states, then development could not proceed. If host states were to
acquiesce in recognition of the shared understanding that mining cannot
accord with the promise of sustainable development without full
implementation of the three pillars of participation rights, then home state
practice would contribute to the development of customary international
law.
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